Newmont Corporation (NEM) is a 100-year-old Denver mining company that has spent the last seven years trying to buy its way to dominance. It acquired Goldcorp for $10 billion in 2019. It acquired Newcrest Mining for $19.2 billion in 2023. It formed the Nevada Gold Mines JV with Barrick Gold to consolidate the richest gold trend in America. By the end of 2025, Newmont was the undisputed largest gold producer on the planet: 5.9 million attributable ounces, $22.7 billion in revenue, $7.3 billion in free cash flow, and 118.2 million ounces of proven and probable reserves, the biggest stockpile in the industry.
And now it is suing its JV partner, operating without a permanent CFO, navigating a CEO transition, entering a self-described “trough year” for production, and watching its costs climb while hoping the gold price, currently near $4,685 per ounce, keeps doing the heavy lifting. Newmont is the only gold producer in the S&P 500, the only one in the Fortune 500, and one of the more interesting stories in the market right now.
Finding Invisible Gold
Newmont was incorporated in Delaware on May 2, 1921, by Colonel William Boyce Thompson. The name is a portmanteau of “New York” and “Montana.” Thompson built it as a holding company for mining, oil, and gas investments, and for its first four decades it functioned more like a natural-resources investment fund than an operating company, holding stakes in Magma Copper, Kennecott, and various oil properties.
The pivotal moment came in 1965 with the discovery of the Carlin Trend in Nevada. Newmont geologists found that gold could exist in microscopic, “invisible” form within sedimentary rock. Conventional wisdom said you needed to see gold in the rock to mine it profitably. Carlin proved otherwise, opening up what would become one of the richest gold-producing regions on Earth.
Over the next three decades, Newmont shed its non-gold assets, went pure-play, and expanded internationally. It opened Yanacocha in Peru in 1992, which became South America’s largest gold mine. It acquired Santa Fe Pacific Gold in a hostile takeover in 1996. It bought Battle Mountain Gold in 2001. By the 2010s, Newmont was a top-tier producer with a reputation for relative operational discipline in a sector not always known for it.
Then management decided that bigger was better.
$29 Billion in Acquisitions
The Goldcorp acquisition in 2019 added Canadian and Mexican assets, including Peñasquito, Mexico’s largest gold mine. That same year, after Barrick Gold launched and then withdrew a hostile takeover bid, the two companies instead combined their adjacent Nevada operations into Nevada Gold Mines. Barrick would operate the JV with 61.5% ownership. Newmont would hold 38.5%, collect its share of cash flow, and appoint two of five board managers. The pitch was billions in synergies from consolidating overlapping operations along the Carlin Trend. The arrangement would later become the source of the company’s biggest headache.
In 2023, Newmont completed the Newcrest acquisition, the largest gold mining deal in history at $19.2 billion in stock. Newcrest brought in Cadia, a world-class copper-gold mine in Australia; Lihir, one of the world’s largest gold mines by reserves, located in Papua New Guinea; Brucejack, a high-grade underground mine in British Columbia; and Red Chris, a copper-gold operation with long-term block cave potential. Overnight, Newmont went from the largest gold miner to something that resembled a gold and copper conglomerate spanning five continents and more than 20 mines.
The problem was digesting all of it. Fiscal year 2023 was a disaster: a $2.5 billion net loss driven by $1.9 billion in impairment charges and $1.26 billion in reclamation cost revisions. FCF was $88 million on $11.8 billion in revenue. The company was simultaneously integrating Newcrest, managing Goldcorp legacy assets that had never fully delivered, and navigating community tensions in Peru, labor disputes in Mexico, and cost inflation everywhere.
Selling Seven Mines for $4 Billion
Management responded by selling. Between late 2024 and 2025, Newmont divested seven producing assets and one development project. Total consideration across all deals was roughly $4.0 billion, a mix of cash, deferred payments, equity stakes, and royalties. The program generated net gains of $738 million on completed sales.
Each deal had its own buyer and its own structure.
| Asset | Buyer | Close Date | Total Consideration | Net Gain/(Loss) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Telfer + 70% of Havieron (Australia) | Greatland Gold | Dec 2024 | $453M | ($160M) |
| CC&V (Colorado) | SSR Mining | Feb 2025 | $263M | $2M |
| Musselwhite (Ontario) | Orla Mining | Feb 2025 | $813M | $19M |
| Éléonore (Quebec) | Dhilmar Ltd | Feb 2025 | $784M | $172M |
| Porcupine (Ontario) | Discovery Silver | Apr 2025 | $541M | $28M |
| Akyem (Ghana) | Zijin Mining | Apr 2025 | $972M | $683M |
| Coffee Project (Yukon) | Fuerte Metals | Oct 2025 | $155M | ($6M) |
The gains and losses in that table measure against the carrying value of net assets divested, not against what Newmont originally paid. Several assets were already written down in 2024 before the sales closed. Porcupine took a cumulative $358 million loss from initial held-for-sale classification through close, including prior-period write-downs. The $28 million gain on the completed sale only partially offset that. Coffee followed a similar pattern: a $161 million cumulative loss through the held-for-sale period, then a $6 million final loss at close.
The standout was Akyem, the Ghanaian gold mine sold to Chinese state-owned Zijin Mining for $972 million. Newmont booked a $683 million gain, the largest single gain in the entire program.
What Newmont Didn’t Leave Behind
Not all of the consideration was cash at close, and several deals left Newmont with ongoing financial exposure.
CC&V. The sale to SSR Mining is the most interesting deal in the program. SSR paid $109 million in cash at closing, plus up to $175 million in deferred payments contingent on certain regulatory approvals, including resolution of applications related to the historic Carlton Tunnel, a drainage tunnel completed in 1941 that has been the subject of ongoing water quality disputes with Colorado regulators since 2021. The real issue is an open-ended indemnification: Newmont agreed to cover 90% of any closure costs exceeding $500 million related to its historical mining activities at CC&V, with no cap on maximum future payments. Newmont has the option to settle this obligation through a one-time lump-sum payment at certain milestones, but until it does, this is an uncapped contingent liability. Given that Newmont’s reclamation obligations across its entire portfolio have historically trended upward, the CC&V indemnification is worth watching.
Telfer and Havieron. The sale to Greatland Gold produced a $160 million loss, with only $217 million in cash at close. The deferred component includes up to $100 million tied to future Havieron production and the gold price over five years. Newmont also received 134 million Greatland shares, which it accounted for as an equity method investment. In Q2 2025, Newmont sold 67 million of those shares for $274 million. In January 2026, a third party exercised an option on the remaining 67 million shares, delivering another $134 million. The equity component ultimately produced $408 million in cash against a $242 million book value at close. The loss on the deal was front-loaded; the equity monetization made it look considerably better in hindsight.
Akyem. The Zijin sale included $100 million in deferred consideration contingent on ratification of the mining lease by Ghana’s Parliament, plus a $200 million indemnification capped at five years for losses arising from non-ratification. The lease was ratified in Q3 2025, triggering receipt of the $100 million, removal of the indemnification, and an additional $35 million gain. Clean exit.
Coffee. The Yukon development project went to Fuerte Metals for $10 million in cash, plus $80 million in Fuerte equity (partially sold in Q4 2025) and a 3% net smelter return royalty on all future production. If Coffee ever becomes a producing mine, Newmont collects a perpetual royalty stream with no capital or operating obligation. It is a small-dollar deal, but the structure is worth noting: Newmont retained upside through a royalty while shedding all development risk and future capital commitment.
Porcupine. Discovery Silver paid $201 million in cash and $233 million in Discovery shares, which Newmont fully sold in Q3 2025. There is also a $150 million note receivable, payable in four equal annual installments starting December 31, 2027. Newmont will be collecting $37.5 million per year from Discovery Silver through 2030.
Musselwhite. Orla Mining paid $799 million in cash plus up to $40 million in deferred payments, structured as two $20 million installments contingent on the average gold price over the respective periods. These contingent payments are accounted for as derivatives, so their carrying value fluctuates with gold.
Éléonore. The cleanest exit in the program. Dhilmar Ltd paid $784 million in cash. No deferred payments, no equity, no royalties, no indemnifications. Newmont booked a $172 million gain and walked away.
What Remains
After the program closed, Newmont still has active financial ties to several of the assets it sold:
| Ongoing Item | Nature | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| CC&V closure indemnification | 90% of closure costs above $500M, uncapped | Potentially significant |
| Porcupine note receivable | $150M in 4 annual installments, starting Dec 2027 | $150M (scheduled) |
| Coffee NSR royalty | 3% royalty on future production | Depends on mine development |
| Musselwhite contingent payments | Up to $40M, tied to gold price | Up to $40M |
| Telfer/Havieron deferred payments | Up to $100M, tied to production and gold price over 5 years | Up to $100M |
The divestitures accomplished what management intended: a leaner portfolio, $4 billion in proceeds, and the financial flexibility to pay down $3.4 billion of debt and buy back $2.3 billion of stock. But Newmont did not walk away from every liability. The CC&V indemnification creates a long-tail obligation that could grow if Colorado regulators tighten closure requirements, and the Porcupine note receivable means Newmont is carrying credit exposure to Discovery Silver through 2030.
A Record Year, on Paper
The divestiture program coincided with a gold price that simply would not stop rising. Newmont’s average realized price went from $1,954 per ounce in 2023 to $2,408 in 2024 to $3,498 in 2025. The financial turnaround was dramatic:
| 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.8B | $18.7B | $22.7B |
| Gold Revenue | $10.6B | $15.8B | $19.3B |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $4.2B | $8.7B | $13.5B |
| Net Income | ($2.5B) | $3.4B | $7.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $88M | $2.9B | \(7.3B | | Avg. Realized Gold (\)/oz) |
| Gold Oz. Sold (consolidated) | 5.42M | 6.54M | 5.52M |
The gold price did most of the work. Newmont sold fewer ounces in 2025 (5.52M) than in 2024 (6.54M) because of the divestitures, yet revenue grew 21% because the realized price jumped 45%.
Management used the cash to fix the balance sheet. Newmont entered 2025 with $5.3 billion in net debt and exited with $2.1 billion in net cash, a swing of over $7 billion in a single year. The company used $3.4 billion to retire debt, spent $2.3 billion on share buybacks, and still ended the year with $7.6 billion in cash against $5.1 billion in total debt. An undrawn $4 billion credit facility pushed total liquidity to $11.6 billion. The quarterly dividend sits at $0.26 per share, or $1.04 annualized.
Gold accounts for 85% of sales. Copper contributes 6%, silver 5%, zinc 3%, and lead 1%. The copper exposure from Cadia, Boddington, and Red Chris gives Newmont a secondary lever that most pure-play gold peers lack.
A 40% Tax Rate Baked Into the Map
One structural feature that gets less attention than it deserves: Newmont’s effective tax rate was 40% in 2025. That is well above most gold mining peers, and it is not a one-time anomaly. It is baked into where the mines sit. Papua New Guinea operations carried a 74% effective rate. Peru was at 107%, driven by withholding taxes and non-deductible items. Ghana ran at 41%. Mexico was at 41%.
Every dollar of EBITDA converts to less free cash flow at Newmont than it would for a competitor like Agnico Eagle, whose assets are concentrated in Canada and other lower-tax jurisdictions. On $13.5 billion of adjusted EBITDA in 2025, Newmont paid $4.6 billion in income taxes. That gap compounds over time.
And the tax situation may be getting worse. Ghana’s stability agreement with Newmont expired on December 31, 2025. The government is now proposing a sliding-scale royalty regime ranging from 5% to 12%, tied to the gold price. At $4,685 gold, Newmont would be paying the top rate. Parliament is expected to consider the proposal in the first half of 2026. Ahafo, the company’s Ghanaian operation (including the newly commissioned Ahafo North, which achieved commercial production in October 2025), produced a meaningful share of total output. Higher royalties there directly reduce margin on every ounce.
Suing Your JV Partner
The most consequential near-term story is the escalating fight between Newmont and Barrick Gold over Nevada Gold Mines. NGM produced roughly 999,000 attributable gold ounces for Newmont in 2025, accounting for about 18% of consolidated production, all of it in the most politically stable mining jurisdiction in the world.
On January 26, 2026, Newmont informed Barrick and the NGM board that it had identified evidence of mismanagement. On February 3, it sent a formal notice of default under the JV agreement. The core allegation: Barrick has been diverting shared NGM equipment, technical staff, and administrative resources to accelerate development of Fourmile, a 100%-Barrick-owned gold discovery sitting adjacent to the JV’s Cortez operations. Newmont has described this as “resource piracy.”
The timing adds a layer of complexity. Barrick has been preparing a potential IPO of a new vehicle called “NewCo” that would house its interests in NGM, Pueblo Viejo in the Dominican Republic, and the Fourmile project itself. On February 9, Newmont publicly called on Barrick to improve NGM’s operational performance before proceeding with any listing.
Barrick says it disagrees with Newmont’s claims but is constrained by the JV terms in what it can say publicly.
The JV agreement gives an accused party 30 days to remedy a default or begin corrective action. That window expired without resolution. The dispute now appears headed for Nevada district court, and the industry is bracing for a protracted discovery process. Newmont also holds a contractual right of first refusal over moves affecting the venture, which gives it potential leverage over any NewCo transaction.
If Newmont prevails, it could force operational changes at NGM, extract financial remedies, or gain leverage to acquire Barrick’s JV stake or Fourmile on favorable terms. If the dispute drags on, or if Barrick retaliates by deprioritizing NGM operations, Newmont loses cash flow from its best U.S. asset. Either outcome reshapes the company’s earnings profile.
A New CEO and No CFO
Tom Palmer, who led Newmont through the Goldcorp deal, the Barrick JV formation, and the Newcrest acquisition, retired on December 31, 2025. The board appointed Natascha Viljoen as President and CEO effective January 1, 2026, making her the first woman to lead the company in its 100-year history.
Viljoen, age 55, is a metallurgic engineer who spent six years at Lonmin, then a career at Anglo American where she ultimately ran the platinum business as CEO from 2020 to 2022, overseeing one of the world’s largest platinum group metals operations. She joined Newmont in October 2023 as COO, was promoted to President and COO in May 2025, and assumed the top job seven months later. Her compensation package includes a $1.2 million base salary, a 150% target short-term incentive, and $7 million in target long-term incentives.
Peter Wexler, the Chief Legal Officer, is serving as Interim CFO. The company has not announced a timeline for a permanent appointment. Running a $23 billion revenue company through a major legal dispute, a multi-billion-dollar capital program, and complex international tax optimization without a permanent finance chief is a notable gap.
Four Projects, $4 Billion, and a Trough Year
2026 is the trough. Gold production is guided at roughly 5.3 million attributable ounces, down from 5.9 million in 2025, with AISC rising to about $1,680 per ounce. The decline comes from mine sequencing (lower-grade phases at Cadia and Ahafo South), the completed divestitures, and lower expected output from NGM amid the Barrick dispute. Production is expected to be slightly weighted toward the second half.
The recovery thesis rests on four projects:
Tanami Expansion 2 in Australia’s Northern Territory is a $1.7-1.8 billion project that adds a second decline to the existing underground mine, providing access to deeper ore and extending mine life. Commercial production is targeted for H2 2027.
Cadia Panel Caves in New South Wales is a $2.0-2.4 billion development that opens new underground ore bodies beneath the existing mine. This is what keeps Cadia, one of the world’s best gold-copper assets, running for multiple more decades. Development runs through 2029.
Lihir’s Nearshore Barrier Extension in Papua New Guinea unlocks more than 5 million ounces of reserves and pushes mine life beyond 2040. The project was approved in 2025.
Red Chris Block Cave in British Columbia is still in feasibility studies. If approved, it would transform Red Chris from a modest open-pit operation into a long-life, large-scale copper-gold producer.
Management’s long-term target is roughly 6 million gold ounces plus 150,000 tonnes of copper annually once these projects are ramped. Tanami and Cadia together represent over $4 billion in development capital, and both are complex underground projects where cost overruns and schedule delays are common. The permanent removal of Yanacocha Sulfides from the life-of-mine plan in Q4 2025, after years of development spending, is a recent reminder that not every growth project makes it to production.
Against those future costs, Newmont holds 118.2 million ounces of gold reserves, 12.5 million tonnes of copper, and 442 million ounces of silver. Beyond proven and probable reserves, measured and indicated gold resources add another 88.1 million ounces, and inferred resources add 60.6 million. At 5.5 million ounces of annual depletion, the proven reserve base alone implies a mine life exceeding 20 years. That reserve depth is Newmont’s core competitive advantage. The company can fund decades of production without needing to acquire anything.
Newmont also carries $6.8 billion in reclamation and closure liabilities, the estimated cost to remediate all mine sites at end of life. This number tends to grow, not shrink, as mine plans evolve and environmental standards tighten. It is a real future cash obligation that offsets some of the reserve value, and the CC&V indemnification sits on top of it.
Valuation
The valuation depends almost entirely on your view of the gold price. At $2,500 per ounce (the company’s own impairment testing assumption), Newmont is a solid business generating modest FCF. At $4,685 (current spot), it is a cash-flow machine with two decades of reserves. The range of reasonable outcomes is enormous.
Normalized Free Cash Flow
This approach estimates sustainable annual FCF at different gold prices, using roughly 5.5 million consolidated ounces sold per year and blended AISC of $1,600 per ounce. Development capex is estimated at $1.2 billion annually beyond what is already captured in AISC. The effective tax rate is 40%, consistent with 2025 results and the company’s structural jurisdictional mix.
| Scenario | Gold Price | Margin/oz | Pre-Tax Operating CF | Less Dev. Capex | Less Taxes | Normalized FCF | Per Share (1.088B shares) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $3,000 | $1,400 | $7.7B | $1.2B | $2.6B | $3.9B | $3.58 |
| Base | $4,000 | $2,400 | $13.2B | $1.2B | $4.8B | $7.2B | $6.62 |
| Bull | $4,700 | $3,100 | $17.1B | $1.2B | $6.3B | $9.5B | $8.73 |
Applying a 12-15x FCF multiple (reasonable for a long-life, low-cost miner with 20+ years of reserves):
| Scenario | Normalized FCF | 12x | 15x |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear ($3,000 gold) | $3.9B | $43/share | $54/share |
| Base ($4,000 gold) | $7.2B | $79/share | $99/share |
| Bull ($4,700 gold) | $9.5B | $105/share | $131/share |
EV/EBITDA
Using 2025 adjusted EBITDA of $13.5 billion (generated at $3,498 realized gold) and adding $2.1 billion in net cash to convert from enterprise value to equity value:
| Multiple | EV | Equity Value | Per Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6x (trough) | $80.9B | $83.0B | $76 |
| 8x | $107.8B | $109.9B | $101 |
| 10x | $134.8B | $136.9B | $126 |
If gold holds near $4,685 in 2026, even with lower production volumes, adjusted EBITDA could exceed $14-15 billion, pushing these numbers higher across every scenario.
Reserve Value Sanity Check
Newmont’s 118.2 million ounces of proven and probable gold reserves, at a $4,685 gold price, carry a gross in-situ value of roughly $554 billion. Gold miners typically capture 5-15% of in-situ value as equity value after accounting for extraction costs, taxes, reclamation, and capital investment.
| Recovery Rate | Implied Equity Value | Per Share |
|---|---|---|
| 5% (conservative) | $27.7B | $25 |
| 10% | $55.4B | $51 |
| 15% | $83.1B | $76 |
At 10-15% recovery, you get $51-76 per share on reserves alone, before accounting for the 88 million ounces of M&I resources, existing processing infrastructure, or the scarcity premium of being the only S&P 500 gold miner.
Summary
| Scenario | Method | Per Share Range |
|---|---|---|
| Bear ($3,000 gold, trough multiples) | Normalized FCF / EV/EBITDA | $43 - $76 |
| Base ($4,000 gold, moderate multiples) | Normalized FCF / EV/EBITDA | $79 - $101 |
| Bull ($4,700 gold, higher multiples) | Normalized FCF / EV/EBITDA | $105 - $131 |
The base case at $4,000 gold, roughly 15% below current spot, suggests a per-share value of $79-101. The bull case, with gold staying near today’s levels, stretches to $105-131.
The bear case is real. Between 2015 and 2023, the average annual gold price ranged from $1,160 to $1,943. Gold at $3,000 is already well above that historical range, and even at that level the per-share value compresses to $43-76. The current macro backdrop supports higher gold, but mean reversion is always a possibility, and the title of this post works in both directions.
Two clear ways to be wrong. First: being too bearish on gold. If central bank demand and fiscal concerns keep gold above $4,500 for several years, Newmont’s FCF will be extraordinary, debt goes to zero, buybacks shrink the share count, and per-share value compounds faster than these models show. Second: being too bullish on operations. The Barrick dispute, the CFO vacancy, execution risk on $4+ billion of underground projects, the 40% tax rate, and potential new royalty burdens in Ghana could all erode the cash flow these models assume. The Yanacocha Sulfides write-off is a recent reminder of how development-stage assumptions can unravel.
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What to Watch
| Catalyst | Why It Matters | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2026 earnings | First quarter under new CEO; initial read on 2026 production and cost trends | Late April 2026 |
| Barrick/NGM litigation | Discovery proceedings would surface details on JV economics and Fourmile resource diversion claims | Q2-Q3 2026 |
| Permanent CFO appointment | Filling this gap is overdue for a company of this complexity | TBD |
| Ghana royalty legislation | Sliding-scale royalty proposal (5-12%) could materially raise costs at Ahafo | H1 2026 |
| Tanami Expansion 2 | Capital ramp and commissioning updates; commercial production targeted for H2 2027 | Ongoing through 2027 |
| Barrick NewCo IPO | Any filing triggers Newmont’s right of first refusal and could reshape the JV | TBD |
| Gold price trajectory | Near $4,685 today; every $100/oz move equals roughly $550M in annual revenue | Continuous |
Sources:
- 10-K filed February 19, 2026 (FY2025)
- 8-K filed February 19, 2026 (Q4/FY2025 Earnings)
- 8-K filed September 29, 2025 (CEO Transition)
- 8-K filed October 23, 2025 (Q3 2025 Earnings)
- 8-K filed May 2, 2025 (Annual Meeting / Officer Changes)
Research and analysis conducted with AI assistance using SEC EDGAR filings as primary sources.