Newell Brands (NWL) is a $7.2 billion-revenue consumer products conglomerate headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. The company owns brands that are almost impossible to avoid in daily American life: Sharpie markers, Rubbermaid containers, Yankee Candle, Coleman camping gear, Graco strollers, Mr. Coffee, Paper Mate pens, EXPO dry-erase markers, Elmer’s glue, and Calphalon cookware, among many others. At a recent price of $3.56, the stock trades 90% below its post-merger highs and carries a market capitalization of roughly $1.5 billion against $4.7 billion in debt. Three years of consecutive net losses, a near-zero free cash flow year in 2025, and a credit rating deep in junk territory make this one of the more consequential turnaround stories in consumer goods.
From Curtain Rods to Consumer Giant
The company traces its roots to 1902, when a small firm called the W.F. Linton Company was incorporated in Ogdensburg, New York, to make brass curtain rods. In 1903, the Linton Company went bankrupt. Edgar A. Newell, the president of the Ogdensburg Board of Trade who had signed off on a $1,000 loan to bring the company to town, took control of the operations and renamed it the Newell Manufacturing Company.
For the next six decades, Newell remained a small, regional manufacturer of curtain hardware. The company’s trajectory changed in 1965 when Daniel C. Ferguson was named president and developed a growth-by-acquisition strategy. Ferguson’s playbook was simple and effective: buy small, well-known consumer products companies, then apply a rigorous integration process called “Newellization” that standardized purchasing, cut costs, and leveraged Newell’s relationships with large retail chains. The Newell Company went public on the NASDAQ in 1972 at $28 per share and moved to the New York Stock Exchange in 1979 under the ticker NWL.
Through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Newell executed over 70 acquisitions in 30 years. The company entered cookware (Mirro in 1983, Calphalon in 1998), glassware (Anchor Hocking in 1987), writing instruments (Sanford/Sharpie in 1992), and dozens of other categories. By 1998, Newell was generating $3.72 billion in revenue with record earnings of $396 million. Compound annual sales and EPS growth rates over the prior decade were 13% and 16%, respectively.
Then came the first transformative deal.
The Rubbermaid Merger: The Original “Merger From Hell”
In October 1998, Newell announced its largest acquisition by far: the $5.8 billion purchase of Rubbermaid. The deal, which closed in March 1999, was ten times larger than any previous Newell acquisition and nearly doubled the company’s size. BusinessWeek magazine later dubbed it the “merger from hell.”
Rubbermaid was a household name with strong brand recognition but had serious operational problems, including poor customer service and a troubled distribution system. Newell’s management hoped that the Newellization process could fix Rubbermaid’s operations while Rubbermaid’s product development capabilities would spread to the broader Newell portfolio. The reality was far more painful. Restructuring costs totaled $241.6 million in the first year alone. Newell shareholders lost 50% of their value in the two years after closing, and Rubbermaid shareholders lost 35%. In 2002, the company wrote off $500 million in goodwill.
The combined company, renamed Newell Rubbermaid, eventually stabilized. In 2000, it acquired Gillette’s stationery products division, adding the Paper Mate, Parker, and Waterman brands. In 2002, it bought American Tool Companies (Irwin, Vise-Grip). Through the 2000s, the company continued acquiring and integrating. By the time Michael B. Polk joined as president and CEO in July 2011, Newell Rubbermaid was a focused, mid-sized consumer goods company generating roughly $6 billion in revenue.
The Jarden Acquisition: How $15 Billion Destroyed a Company
In December 2015, Newell Rubbermaid announced it would acquire Jarden Corporation for approximately $15 billion in cash and stock. The deal closed on April 15, 2016. The combined entity was renamed Newell Brands, with roughly $16 billion in revenue and over 57,000 employees.
Understanding Jarden is essential to understanding the current Newell. Jarden itself originated from a 2001 spinoff of Ball Corporation’s consumer products business and had spent over a decade under CEO Martin Franklin as an aggressive serial acquirer. Among its deals:
- American Household, Inc. for $845 million in 2005 (Coleman, Sunbeam, Mr. Coffee, Oster)
- K2 Sports for $1.2 billion in 2007 (Rawlings, Marmot, and other outdoor/sports brands)
- Yankee Candle for $1.75 billion in 2013
- Numerous smaller acquisitions including FoodSaver, Contigo, NUK, Campingaz, and Ball (canning, licensed)
By the time Newell acquired it, Jarden was generating over $10 billion in annual revenue across an extraordinarily diverse portfolio. CEO Michael Polk argued that combining the two companies would create scale advantages, synergies, and margin expansion. The company announced plans to maintain its investment-grade credit rating by using combined cash flows to reduce leverage to 3.0-3.5x.
That leverage target was never achieved.
The Post-Merger Collapse
Sales trends worsened by early 2017. Revenue missed expectations, and the stock, which had traded above $50 before the merger announcement, began a decline that would not stop for years. The all-time high for the post-merger company was $36.91, reached on June 16, 2017. It has not come close to that level since.
The integration problems were severe. The two companies had fundamentally different cultures and operating philosophies. Jarden’s former management had run each brand largely autonomously with lean corporate overhead; Newell’s approach was centralized and process-driven. The clash produced paralysis, talent departures, and poor execution across the portfolio.
In early 2018, activist investor Starboard Value (4.5% stake) launched a campaign to replace the entire board, teaming up with former Jarden chairman Martin Franklin and former Jarden CEO Jim Lillie. The activists argued, correctly, that Newell had been performing poorly since the Jarden acquisition and that CEO Polk needed to go. Shortly after, Carl Icahn disclosed a 6.86% stake and signaled he would seek board representation.
The company initially tried to resist, then settled with both activists. Icahn received four board seats. The asset divestiture target was raised from $6 billion to $10 billion. Over the following 18 months, the company sold off brand after brand, mostly former Jarden units, often at prices well below what had been paid:
- K2 Sports and Völkl (2017)
- Waddington food containers to Novolex (May 2018)
- Rawlings to Seidler Equity Partners (June 2018)
- Goody to ACON Investments (August 2018)
- Pure Fishing to Sycamore Partners for $1.3 billion (November 2018)
- Jostens to Platinum Equity for $1.3 billion (November 2018)
- United States Playing Card Company to Cartamundi (June 2019)
- Process Solutions, Diamond, and other businesses
CEO Michael Polk left in 2019. Chris Peterson, who had joined as CFO in December 2018, served as interim CEO from June to October 2019. Ravi Saligram took over as CEO in October 2019 and led the company through the pandemic, retiring in May 2023. Peterson, who had been serving as President since May 2022, was then named CEO, a position he holds today.
The company is now on its fourth CEO since the Jarden deal closed in 2016.
What Newell Looks Like Today
The current Newell Brands operates in three segments. The financial picture across those segments tells the story of a company where one division subsidizes everything else.
Learning & Development: The Profitable Core
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.69B | $2.75B | $2.77B |
| Operating Income | $464M | $424M | $324M |
| Operating Margin | 17.2% | 15.4% | 11.7% |
The Learning & Development segment houses the company’s most durable assets. The Writing business ($1.68 billion in revenue) includes Sharpie, Paper Mate, EXPO, Parker, Elmer’s, and Dymo. The Baby business ($1.01 billion) is built around Graco strollers and car seats, plus NUK bottles and pacifiers.
These are strong brands with real switching costs. EXPO markers and Sharpie are institutional purchases in schools, offices, and warehouses across the country. Graco is a default choice for first-time parents. L&D generated $464 million in operating income in 2025 on modestly declining revenue, with margins expanding from 11.7% to 17.2% over two years. This segment alone justifies serious attention.
One significant risk is buried in the 10-K’s risk factor disclosures: the Baby business unit has a single source of supply for products that comprise a majority of its sales, and that supplier owns the intellectual property rights for many of those products. If that relationship were disrupted for any reason, it would be catastrophic for the segment that generates all of Newell’s operating profit.
Home & Commercial Solutions: The Drag
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.77B | $4.07B | $4.49B |
| Operating Income (Loss) | ($138M) | ($2M) | ($290M) |
| Operating Margin | (3.7%) | (0.0%) | (6.5%) |
H&CS is 52% of revenue and the segment that best illustrates what went wrong with the Jarden acquisition. The Kitchen business ($1.83 billion) sells Mr. Coffee, Oster, Crockpot, Sunbeam, Calphalon, and FoodSaver. The Commercial business ($1.30 billion) is anchored by Rubbermaid Commercial Products. The Home Fragrance business ($648 million) is Yankee Candle, WoodWick, and Chesapeake Bay Candle.
Revenue declined 7.3% in 2025 and the operating loss deepened from ($2 million) to ($138 million), driven by $114 million in tariff costs, $290 million in tradename impairment charges, and the fixed-cost pain of selling less through the same infrastructure. The kitchen appliance brands are losing a slow war against imports and private label. A $30 Mr. Coffee machine competes directly against a $20 Amazon Basics equivalent that ships with Prime. The Yankee Candle retail footprint is shrinking; the company closed 20 stores in January 2026.
Rubbermaid Commercial Products is the standout within H&CS, with institutional relationships and a brand that carries real weight in commercial cleaning and maintenance. It deserves better than being averaged into a money-losing segment.
The competitive dynamics across H&CS are worsening. Amazon, which accounts for 17% of Newell’s total revenue, is expanding private-label products in categories where H&CS competes directly: storage containers, kitchen appliances, and home goods. For commoditized products like basic coffee makers or food storage, the brand premium that justified the original acquisition prices is eroding. Walmart (13% of revenue) exerts similar pricing pressure. When your two largest customers are also your most direct competitors in adjacent product lines, the long-term margin outlook is bleak. Tariffs compounded the problem in 2025, adding $114 million in costs. The company’s 15 U.S. manufacturing plants provide some buffer, but the kitchen brands sourced from Asia bore the brunt.
Outdoor & Recreation: Improving but Subscale
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $741M | $794M | $879M |
| Operating Income (Loss) | ($25M) | ($86M) | ($120M) |
| Operating Margin | (3.4%) | (10.8%) | (13.7%) |
O&R houses Coleman (camping), Marmot (technical apparel), Contigo (hydration), Campingaz, and Bubba. The segment is still losing money but improved significantly in 2025, narrowing its operating loss from ($86M) to ($25M). Revenue declined 6.7%. These are real brands with loyal followings in the outdoor community, but at $741 million in revenue, the segment may lack the scale to operate profitably as a standalone business within Newell’s cost structure.
The Financial Reality
Three Consecutive Years of Net Losses
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales | $7.20B | $7.58B | $8.13B |
| Gross Margin | 33.8% | 33.6% | 28.9% |
| Operating Income (Loss) | $39M | $67M | ($85M) |
| Net Loss | ($285M) | ($216M) | ($388M) |
| Diluted EPS | ($0.68) | ($0.52) | ($0.94) |
Revenue has declined every year since the Jarden merger. From a peak of roughly $16 billion in 2016, the company now generates $7.2 billion, a decline of over 55% (though much of the reduction is from divestitures rather than organic decline). The positive trend is in gross margins, which improved from 28.9% to 33.8% over two years, reflecting restructuring benefits and exiting low-margin businesses.
The net losses in all three years are driven by enormous non-cash impairment charges: $346 million in 2025, $353 million in 2024, and $342 million in 2023, totaling over $1 billion in three years. Additionally, the company has spent $202 million on restructuring charges across the same period, with another $75-90 million planned for 2026.
The Cash Flow Deterioration
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $264M | $496M | $930M |
| Capital Expenditures | ($247M) | ($259M) | ($284M) |
| Free Cash Flow | $17M | $237M | $646M |
| Cash Interest Paid | $354M | $319M | $298M |
| Dividends Paid | $120M | $118M | $184M |
Free cash flow collapsed to $17 million in 2025, down from $237 million in 2024 and $646 million in 2023. The company paid $354 million in cash interest and $120 million in dividends on just $264 million of operating cash flow. That math works only because capital expenditure was constrained and working capital timing provided a modest offset.
The cash flow trajectory is alarming. OCF declined $232 million year over year, driven by lower receivables (falling sales), $174 million in cash tariff payments, and higher incentive compensation payouts. None of these headwinds appear to be one-time in nature. The company’s 2026 guidance projects operating cash flow of $350-$400 million, which, if achieved, would represent a meaningful recovery but still leaves limited room after interest payments.
The Overseas Cash Trap
A detail buried in the 10-Q for Q3 2025 adds another dimension to the liquidity picture: of the $229 million in cash at September 30, roughly $205 million was held by non-U.S. subsidiaries. The year-end balance of $203 million likely has a similar distribution, meaning domestic cash is only $20-25 million. Domestic liquidity depends almost entirely on the $1 billion Credit Revolver, which had $707 million in net availability as of Q3.
The Debt Stack
Total debt stands at $4.72 billion, spread across maturities from 2027 to 2046:
| Maturity | Amount | Coupon |
|---|---|---|
| 2027 | $500M | 6.375% |
| 2028 | $1,250M | 8.500% |
| 2029 | $500M | 6.625% |
| 2030 | $750M | 6.375% |
| 2032-2046 | $1,588M | 5.375%-5.500% |
| Credit Revolver (Aug 2027) | ~$130M drawn | Variable |
| Total | $4,718M |
The 8.5% 2028 notes were the product of a May 2025 refinancing in which the company redeemed its $1.25 billion of 4.2% notes due 2026 and replaced them with the new notes at more than double the coupon. The transaction added roughly $54 million per year in interest expense. It was a survival move: the company could not pay off $1.25 billion at maturity, so it refinanced at a punishing rate for two more years of runway.
The new 8.5% notes include restrictive covenants limiting additional debt, liens, asset sales, affiliate transactions, and distributions to shareholders. Those restrictions only fall away if the notes receive an investment-grade rating, which, given the current B2 (Moody’s) and B+ (S&P) ratings, is not a near-term possibility.
Both agencies downgraded Newell twice, once in 2024 and again in Q2 2025. Each downgrade triggered coupon step-up provisions on certain outstanding notes, with the additional interest taking effect in Q4 2025. The company is now at the maximum step-up level on affected bonds.
The Credit Revolver ($1 billion facility, maturing August 2027) is secured by receivables, inventory, equipment, and intellectual property, and carries financial covenants including a Collateral Coverage Ratio and Total Net Leverage Ratio. A covenant breach would trigger cross-default provisions across all of the company’s debt, effectively an acceleration event. The company was in compliance as of September 30, 2025.
The critical window is 2027 to 2028, when the revolver matures ($1B facility), the 6.375% notes come due ($500M), and the massive 8.5% notes mature ($1.25B). The company will need to refinance roughly $1.75 billion in an 18-month window at junk-level credit ratings.
The Restructuring Treadmill
One of the most telling patterns in Newell’s recent history is the constant cadence of restructuring programs:
| Plan | Launched | Total Charges | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Project Phoenix | 2023 | $110M | Complete |
| Network Optimization | 2023 | $48M | Substantially complete |
| Realignment Plan | 2024 | $82M | Complete end-2025 |
| Productivity Plan | Nov 2025 | $75-90M (est.) | Expected complete end-2026 |
The most recent plan, approved by the Board on November 26, 2025, calls for reducing global professional and clerical headcount by 10% (roughly 900 employees) and closing approximately 20 company-operated retail locations (all Yankee Candle stores). Expected annualized pre-tax savings are $110-130 million, with charges of $75-90 million consisting primarily of cash severance payments ($63-78 million), employee transition costs ($8 million), and store closure costs ($4 million).
In total, the company has spent or committed roughly $320 million on restructuring charges since 2023 across four separate plans. Each plan has delivered real savings, and the improvement in gross margins from 28.9% to 33.8% over two years is genuine evidence that the cost structure is being addressed. The concern is that revenue has declined every year during this period. The savings are running to stay in place, not to get ahead.
The $5 Billion Goodwill Write-Down
When Newell acquired Jarden in 2016, it recorded approximately $8.28 billion in goodwill. As of December 31, 2025, the goodwill balance stands at $3.10 billion. The difference ($5.18 billion) has been written off through cumulative impairment charges. In the last three years alone, the company recorded $346 million (2025), $353 million (2024), and $342 million (2023) in combined goodwill and tradename impairments.
The Commercial reporting unit within H&CS ($747 million of goodwill) is currently within 10% of its estimated fair value, meaning another impairment charge is possible with even a modest decline in performance.
Indefinite-lived tradenames started the year at $844 million and ended at $553 million after $340 million in impairment charges in 2025. The brands that Newell paid billions for in 2016 are being marked down year after year, and the write-downs continue with no sign of stopping.
The IRS Dispute
The company is disputing IRS regulations from 2020 that would retroactively change the treatment of a 2018 tax benefit. Newell’s position is that the regulations were “not validly issued.” If the IRS prevails, the company would owe between $180 million and $220 million in additional income taxes, plus interest and penalties. The company has not reserved for this contingency. At current cash flow levels, an adverse ruling would likely require additional borrowing or asset sales to fund the payment.
2026 Guidance
At the Q4 2025 earnings release on February 6, 2026, management provided 2026 guidance:
| Metric | 2026 Guidance |
|---|---|
| Net sales growth | -1% to +1% |
| Core sales growth | -2% to flat |
| Normalized EPS | $0.54 to $0.60 |
| Operating cash flow | $350M to $400M |
The stock fell 11.7% on the earnings release. Investors focused on the continued revenue weakness, the 5.1x leverage ratio, and the weak Q1 outlook.
The operating cash flow guidance of $350-400 million, if achieved, would represent a meaningful improvement from 2025’s $264 million. After roughly $250 million in CapEx and $354 million in interest payments, FCF would be approximately $100-150 million, enough to cover the current dividend ($120 million) with little left for debt reduction.
Valuation
Sum-of-Parts Approach
Learning & Development:
L&D generated $464 million in operating income and roughly $533 million in EBITDA (adding back $69 million in D&A). Comparable branded consumer products businesses with this level of brand durability, market share, and margin stability trade at 9-13x EBITDA. The Graco single-source supplier risk and the sequential decline in L&D Q4 margins warrant a slight discount. Bear, base, and bull scenarios use 9x, 10.5x, and 13x EBITDA on normalized earnings of $510M, $520M, and $530M respectively, producing segment values of $4.6B, $5.5B, and $6.9B.
Home & Commercial Solutions:
H&CS lost $138 million at the operating line in 2025. After adding back D&A ($142M) and non-cash impairments ($290M), underlying EBITDA was roughly $294 million. Sustainable normalized EBITDA is lower, perhaps $100-160 million, given the structural decline in kitchen appliances and the persistent revenue erosion. Rubbermaid Commercial is the most valuable sub-business here. Bear, base, and bull scenarios apply 4x, 5x, and 7x multiples to normalized EBITDA of $100M, $130M, and $160M, producing segment values of $400M, $650M, and $1.1B.
Outdoor & Recreation:
O&R barely generates positive EBITDA ($6 million) but houses strong brands. Coleman and Marmot would attract strategic interest. A brand-value approach based on comparable outdoor-brand transactions produces segment values of $200M, $350M, and $550M across the three scenarios.
Sum-of-Parts Summary
Net obligations total $5.69B, consisting of $4.72B in gross debt, $400M in off-balance-sheet factored receivables, $550M in operating lease present value, a 25% risk-weighted IRS contingency of $50M, less $30M in accessible domestic cash. The overseas cash balance ($175-180M) is excluded because repatriating it involves meaningful tax friction and structural complexity.
| Scenario | L&D | H&CS | O&R | Total EV | Net Obligations | Equity Value | Per Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $4.6B | $0.4B | $0.2B | $5.2B | ($5.69B) | Negative | $0.00 |
| Base | $5.5B | $0.65B | $0.35B | $6.5B | ($5.69B) | $810M | $1.93 |
| Bull | $6.9B | $1.1B | $0.55B | $8.6B | ($5.69B) | $2.91B | $6.94 |
The bear case produces negative equity: the debt stack consumes all the value and shareholders are left with nothing. The base case suggests the stock is worth roughly $1.93, which is below the current price of $3.56. The bull case, which requires successful execution on the Productivity Plan, revenue stabilization, and a manageable refinancing of the 2027-2028 maturities, gets to $6.94.
DCF Cross-Check
A simplified DCF using management’s 2026 OCF guidance of $375 million (midpoint), declining 2% annually for five years, with CapEx at $250 million, a 10% discount rate, and a 6x terminal multiple on year-5 FCF, produces an enterprise value of roughly $5.9 billion. After netting out the $5.69 billion in obligations, this implies equity value of $210 million, or about $0.50 per share. The DCF is more conservative than the sum-of-parts because it relies on consolidated cash flows rather than attributing standalone multiples to the profitable L&D segment.
The key insight across all methods: the margin of error between equity being worth something and equity being worth nothing is thin. The debt load dominates the equity story. Small changes in revenue trajectory, interest rates on refinanced debt, or segment profitability swing the outcome dramatically.
Management
CEO Chris Peterson took the role in May 2023, making him the fourth CEO since the Jarden deal closed. Before joining Newell as CFO in December 2018, he held senior finance and operating roles at Revlon, Ralph Lauren, and Procter & Gamble. He also served as Interim CEO from June to October 2019, effectively steadying the ship between the Polk ouster and the Saligram hiring, before being named permanent CEO four years later.
Peterson knows the company’s financials better than any CEO in its history. Whether that translates into the operational turnaround the business needs is a different question. The executive incentive structure is weighted toward cash flow productivity, adjusted EPS, and cost savings rather than revenue growth, which is the right framework for a company in Newell’s position but does mean no one in the C-suite is being paid to figure out how to sell more Sharpies.
The Dividend: $120 Million a Year the Company Cannot Afford
Newell pays an annual dividend of $0.28 per share, costing roughly $120 million per year. In 2025, free cash flow was $17 million. The dividend was not covered by cash generation. It was funded by drawing down the balance sheet of a company that already carries $4.7 billion in junk-rated debt.
The company paid $354 million in cash interest in 2025. It spent $247 million on capital expenditures. It generated $264 million in operating cash flow. After keeping the lights on and servicing its debt, there was nothing left for shareholders, and management sent them $120 million anyway.
That $120 million per year, redirected to debt reduction, would retire $600 million in principal over five years, roughly a third of the 2027-2028 maturity wall. It would reduce annual interest expense by $40-50 million, creating a virtuous cycle of lower costs and higher FCF. Instead, it goes out the door to maintain a yield that exists only because the stock has fallen 90%.
The board’s stated position is that it “continues to prioritize debt reduction and improving leverage” while simultaneously paying a dividend that makes debt reduction mathematically impossible at current cash flow levels. These two things cannot both be true. Either the company is serious about deleveraging, or it is serious about the dividend. In 2025, it chose the dividend.
At a B2/B+ credit rating, with $1.75 billion in maturities approaching in 2027-2028, this is not a conservative capital allocation decision. It is the opposite. The dividend signals to creditors that equity holders are extracting cash from a stressed balance sheet rather than shoring it up. If the company were a first-time borrower walking into a bank with these financials, no lender would approve the loan while the borrower was simultaneously handing cash to shareholders. The fact that Newell has been doing this for years does not make it prudent. It makes it a pattern.
The 8.0% yield at $3.56 per share is not a sign of generosity. It is a sign of distress that management refuses to acknowledge.
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What to Watch
| Catalyst | Why It Matters | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2026 earnings | First quarter under 2026 guidance; tests whether OCF recovery is real | April 29, 2026 |
| 2026 tariff impact | Could exceed $174M if current trade policies persist or expand | Throughout 2026 |
| Productivity Plan execution | $110-130M in annualized savings; most actions by end of 2026 | Q2-Q4 2026 |
| Credit Revolver refinancing | $1B facility matures August 2027; must be extended or replaced | H1 2027 |
| Credit rating reviews | Further downgrade would trigger more coupon step-ups and could impair revolver access | Ongoing |
| IRS tax dispute resolution | $180-220M liability if the company loses | Unknown |
| H&CS Commercial goodwill | Within 10% of impairment threshold; another charge possible with modest decline | Next testing date (Q4 2026) |
| Dividend decision | Current payout not covered by FCF; a cut would free up $120M annually | Board review, likely 2026 |
Sources:
- 10-K filed February 13, 2026 (FY2025)
- 10-Q filed October 31, 2025 (Q3 2025)
- 8-K filed February 6, 2026 (Q4 2025 Earnings)
- 8-K filed December 1, 2025 (Productivity Plan)
- 8-K filed May 22, 2025 (8.5% Notes Issuance)
- 8-K filed February 13, 2026 (2026 LTIP/Bonus Program)
- CEO Appointment Press Release, February 10, 2023
- Newell Brands Wikipedia
- Company History (Encyclopedia.com)
Research and analysis conducted with AI assistance using SEC EDGAR filings as primary sources.